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INTRODUCTION: COMPETING MODELS OF INTERCOLLEGIATE
ATHLETICS

T

he National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
Constitution sets forth the ideals that its member educational
institutions are supposed to follow in collectively governing
1
intercollegiate athletics in the United States. It expressly states that
the NCAA’s objective is “to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an
integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral
part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of
demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional
2
sports.” It also states that “[s]tudent-athletes shall be amateurs in an
intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be motivated
primarily by education and by the physical, mental and social benefits
to be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an
avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation
3
by professional and commercial enterprises.” Another key
constitutional principle states that “programs shall be administered in
keeping with prudent management and fiscal practices to assure the
financial stability necessary for providing student-athletes with

1 NCAA, 2013–14 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL §§ 2.1–2.16 (2013) [hereinafter NCAA
MANUAL], available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D114.pdf.
2 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 1.3.1.
3 Id. § 2.9.
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adequate opportunities for athletics competition as an integral part of
4
a quality educational experience.”
Professor Timothy Davis has characterized this idealized view of
5
intercollegiate athletics as the “amateur/education model.” This
“amateurism” component may accurately describe Division III
intercollegiate sports competition and student-athletes, and to some
extent also Division I and II women’s and men’s sports that do not
generate net revenues in excess of their production costs. Consistent
with its educational component, student-athletes’ participation in
intercollegiate athletics provides several academic and future career
benefits. For example, a 2007 NCAA study of 8000 former studentathletes reveals that: (1) eighty-eight percent of student-athletes earn
their baccalaureate degrees, compared to less than twenty-five percent
of the American adult population; (2) ninety-one percent of former
Division I student-athletes are employed full-time, eleven percent
more than the general population, and enjoy higher average income
levels than non-student-athletes; (3) eighty-nine percent of former
student-athletes believe the skills and values learned from
participating in intercollegiate athletics helped them obtain their
current employment in a career other than playing professional sports;
and (4) twenty-seven percent of former Division I student-athletes
6
earn a postgraduate degree.
Davis contrasts the way in which most collegiate sports operate
with how universities in the most popular and successful athletic
conferences (e.g., ACC, Big Ten, Big 12, Pac 12, SEC) operate “big7
time” in Division I men’s basketball and football programs. These
4

Id. § 2.16.
Timothy Davis, Intercollegiate Athletics: Competing Models and Conflicting
Realities, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 269, 270 (1994) (emphasis added).
6 Gary T. Brown, Research Validates Value, and Values, of Athletics, NCAA.ORG (Feb.
12, 2007, 1:01 AM), http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/NCAANewsArchive/2007/Association-wide
/research%2Bvalidates%2Bvalue,%2Band%2Bvalues,%2Bof%2Bathletics%2B-%2B02-1
2-07%2Bncaa%2Bnews.html. A 2013 study showed that eighty-two percent of studentathletes who enrolled in colleges in 2006 have earned their degrees. Michelle Brutlag
Hosick, Division I Student-Athletes Make the Grade, NCAA.ORG (Oct. 24, 2013),
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/division-i-student-athletes-make
-grade. These numbers are vastly improved from the landmark study of Long and Caudill.
See generally James E. Long & Steven B. Caudill, The Impact of Participation in
Intercollegiate Athletics on Income and Graduation, 73 REV. ECON. & STAT. 525 (1991).
7 See Davis, supra note 5, at 276 n.33. The NCAA responded to increased
commercialization, particularly with regard to television revenues and the desire for a
postseason playoff for schools unlikely to receive postseason bowl invitations, by dividing
Division I schools for purposes of football into discrete subdivisions, originally Division I5
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two sports are based on a “commercial/education model,” which
“assumes that college sports is a commercial enterprise subject to the
8
same economic considerations as any other industry.” At the outset,
it is important to recognize that the enormous popularity and
commercialization of college sports is not a recent phenomenon. The
first intercollegiate athletic competition, a rowing competition
between Harvard and Yale in 1852, was sponsored by a railroad
seeking to attract passengers via its new route to the lake on which
9
this event took place. In the 1890s, football teams from prominent
universities played before large crowds of exuberant students and
10
alumni. In the nineteenth century, members of successful Harvard
rowing teams were paid monetary prizes ranging from $100 to
11
$500. In 1906, when the NCAA was founded, some college baseball
12
players also played in summer professional baseball leagues. At the
time of its founding in 1896, the Big Ten Conference permitted two
athletes on the schools’ football teams to be professionals in that
13
sport.
The 1929 Carnegie Report noted the rampant
commercialization of intercollegiate sports with accompanying abuses
14
such as corruption, exploitation, and professionalism.
The steadily increasing trend of commercialization, which has been
fueled in recent years by new media technologies needing popular
A and I-AA, later renamed as the Football Bowl Subdivision and the Football
Championship Subdivision. Kemper C. Powell, A Façade of Amateurism: An Examination
of the NCAA Grant-in-Aid System Under the Sherman Act, 20 SPORTS LAW. J. 241, 244–
45 (2013). Recent NCAA structural reforms are likely to further reorganize big-time
college football governance, as members of the largest football conferences will attain
additional self-governing autonomy. Nicole Auerbach, NCAA Debate on Changes to
Governance Structure to Continue, USA TODAY (Jan. 18, 2014, 8:11 PM), http://www.usa
today.com/story/sports/college/2014/01/18/ncaa-convention-closes-governance/4640857/.
8 Davis, supra note 5, at 279.
9 Andrew Zimbalist, Inequality in Intercollegiate Athletics: Origins, Trends and
Policies, 6 J. INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORT 5, 5 (2013).
10 J. Davenport, From Crew to Commercialism—The Paradox of Sport in Higher
Education, in SPORTS AND THE LAW: A MODERN ANTHOLOGY 218, 218 (Timothy C.
Davis, Alfred D. Mathewson & Kenneth L. Shropshire eds., 1999).
11 Kenneth L. Shropshire, Legislation for the Glory of Sport: Amateurism and
Compensation, in SPORTS AND THE LAW: A MODERN ANTHOLOGY, supra note 10, at 223,
224.
12 See, e.g., Charlie Bevis, Walter Clarkson, SOC’Y AM. BASEBALL RES., http://sabr.org
/bioproj/person/b2cd1049 (last visited Feb. 4, 2014).
13 On the Issues with Mike Gousha: NCAA President Mark Emmert, MARQUETTE
UNIV. (Sept. 16, 2013), http://law-media.marquette.edu/Mediasite/Play/604e43c2fe1a4fda
88f65338d1b853ca1d.
14 John L. Griffith, The Carnegie Reports: Another View of the Study of College
Athletics Made by the Carnegie Foundation, 1 J. HIGHER EDUC. 325, 325–27 (1930).
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content to attract viewers and advertisers––sports is one of the few
15
things that millions of people watch live ––should not be surprising.
The United States marketplace responds to cultural forces and strong
public demand for popular products such as intercollegiate football
and basketball games. Thus, the commercialization of college sports
directly reflects the marketplace realities of our society.
Commercialization also responds to social needs: history
demonstrates that humans have a primal need to compete physically
or witness athletic competitions. Intercollegiate athletics competition
energizes both participating athletes and spectators, a wide and
diverse interconnected tribal group that includes athletes’ family
members and friends, university students, faculty, administration,
16
alumni, non-alumni supporters, and thousands of others. The
undeniable magnetism of intercollegiate sports competition has been
17
analogized to “85,000 people gathered for a family reunion.”
While we agree with Davis’s claim that commercialized college
sports operate in a fundamentally different way than the amateur
sports ideal, we do not believe that big-time college sports are subject
to the same economic forces as purely commercial enterprises like
professional sports. Although Davis’s description is likely true on the
18
revenue side, as athletic directors seek to maximize the commercial
19
return on big-time sports, nonprofit universities do not distribute the
profits generated by commercially successful football and men’s
basketball programs to shareholders. Indeed, athletic directors are
15

Zimbalist, supra note 9, at 13–14.
Matthew J. Mitten, James L. Musselman & Bruce W. Burton, Targeted Reform of
Commercialized Intercollegiate Athletics, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 779, 784 (2010).
17 Id.
18 DONNA M. DESROCHERS, DELTA COST PROJECT AT AM. INST. FOR RESEARCH,
ACADEMIC SPENDING VERSUS ATHLETIC SPENDING: WHO WINS? 9 (2013), available at
http://www.deltacostproject.org/ (“Newly negotiated television contracts are expected to
significantly boost athletic revenues for the top programs in coming years, creating even
more disparity in college athletics. For the top five conferences (ACC, Big 10, Big 12,
Pac-12, and SEC), current media contracts are expected to generate more than $1 billion
per year, with average conference revenues ranging from $12 million to $20 million per
school per year. College sports are big business, and these contracts exceed the annual
media contracts for Major League Baseball, the National Hockey League, and the National
Basketball Association.”).
19 For example, it is difficult to imagine how big-time football programs would have
behaved any differently with regard to TV revenues if they were solely intending to
maximize profits. Stephen F. Ross, Radical Reform of Intercollegiate Athletics: Antitrust
and Public Policy Implications, 86 TULSA L. REV. 933, 965 (2012) [hereinafter Ross,
Radical Reform].
16
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typically motivated to spend surplus revenues from football and
men’s basketball programs on socially worthy causes, which often
include a broad range of intercollegiate sports for elite athletes that do
20
not generate sufficient revenues to pay their costs, and occasionally
21
subsidies for university academic and educational programs. We
suggest that the desire to continue and expand these expensive
programs is the real motivation for engaging in anticompetitive
practices that might be unlawful if engaged in by for-profit non-sports
enterprises (e.g., agreeing to a cap on the value of scholarships
student-athletes receive for their playing services).
Today, America’s academic leaders face
intense pressures to attract larger incoming classes of students with
stronger academic credentials, increase political and cultural
support of their institutions from the larger community, recruit and
retain high quality faculty, enlarge fundraising for brick and mortar,
expand endowment, and grow their academic programs. In an
extremely competitive higher education market, academic leaders
increasingly use intercollegiate sports as a catalyst and means to
achieve these legitimate ends. This [seemingly] rational conduct is
merely a facet of competition in a well-functioning democratic

20 See Cork Gaines, Texas Longhorns: How the Richest School in College Sports Makes
and Spends Its Millions, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 17, 2013, 4:11 PM), http://www.business
insider.com/texas-longhorns-how-the-richest-school-in-college-sports-makes-and-spends
-its-millions-2013-9?op=1 (“It’s clear [that] the football and men’s basketball teams
support the rest of the athletic department. Those two teams combine for approximately
70% of the revenue but only 24% of the expenses.”). For example, Ohio State University’s
athletic department declared $123,604,626 of total revenue for the reporting year from
summer 2012 through summer 2013. Data for Ohio State University, Equity in Athletics
Data Analysis Cutting Tool, OFFICE OF POSTSECONDARY EDUC., http://ope.ed.gov
/athletics/index.aspx (follow “Get data for one institution” hyperlink; then enter “Ohio
State University” in the “Name of Institution” field and select “NCAA Division I-A” as
the Sanctioning Body; then follow “Ohio State University” hyperlink; then follow
“Revenue and Expenses”) (last visited Jan. 28, 2014). Of the total, men’s basketball
contributed $18,781,682 and the football team contributed $61,131,726 in revenue. Id.
Ohio State offers its over 1000 athletes at least thirty-six varsity sports. Liz Young,
Athletic Director Gene Smith Named Ohio State Vice President, Contract Extended to
2020, THELANTERN.COM (Jan. 29, 2014), http://thelantern.com/2014/01/athletic-director
-gene-smith-named-ohio-state-vice-president-contract-extended-2020/.
21 See, e.g., Chris Cusack, New Fund to Funnel Athletics Revenue to Duke Libraries,
THE CHRONICLE (May 25, 2011), http://www.dukechronicle.com/articles/2011/05/26/new
-fund-funnel-athletics-revenue-duke-libraries; Department of Athletics Increases Support
to Main Library to $9 Million, OHIO STATE UNIV. (Aug. 15, 2008), http://www.osu.edu
/news/newsitem2089; UT Athletics Provides Financial Update, UNIV. TENN. (Aug. 27,
2012), http://www.utsports.com/genrel/082712aab.html.
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society that embodies the centuries-old American enterprising spirit
of doing what is necessary to compete successfully.22

On the other hand, some (including one of us) have expressed
concern that, at least to some extent, the diversion of funds otherwise
available for educational purposes to subsidize intercollegiate
athletics is the result of special interest pressure by powerful alumni

22 Mitten, Musselman & Burton, supra note 16, at 792. Sports economist Rodney Fort
has characterized a university’s funding of its athletic department as a budget allocation to
provide a service (e.g., entertainment, identity/loyalty, branding) that furthers broader
institutional objectives (e.g., increased giving to general fund, more and better student
applications, favorable legislative treatment, better faculty and administrators, value added
to student-athletes). RODNEY FORT & JASON WINFREE, 15 SPORTS MYTHS AND WHY
THEY’RE WRONG 22–40 (2013). Many universities have used intercollegiate athletics as a
tool to achieve greater public recognition and prominence. See Jon Solomon, Alabama
Reports $143.4 Million in Athletic Revenue, up 16% from a Year Earlier, AL.COM (Oct.
22, 2013, 2:42 PM), http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2013/10/alabama_reports_1434
_million_i.html; Univ. of Alabama’s Stringent Standards on Possible Trademark
Infringements Examined, SPORTS BUS. DAILY (Nov. 19 2013), http://www.sportsbusiness
daily.com/Daily/Issues/2013/11/19/Marketing-and-Sponsorship/Alabama.aspx. But see
DESROCHERS, supra note 18, at 2–4 (stating that based on recent research, “evidence of
the ancillary benefits of college sports is mixed” with increased student applications from
university athletic success “primarily associated with success in football (winning
championships in particular), and the bump generally lasts only a year or two”; also noting
studies find “little connection” between university’s athletic success and alumni giving
with any positive effects “more often relate[d] to football, rather than basketball, success
and is usually limited to athletic rather than general university donations”). For example,
Notre Dame’s reputation as an internationally renowned university developed in lockstep
with its athletic success on the gridiron. Mitten, Musselman & Burton, supra note 16, at
793. During recent seasons when the University of Florida won multiple national
basketball and football championships, its “fundraising increased by 38% to $183
million—with only 50% of the increase directed to athletics. UF recently launched a new
$1.5 billion university fundraising campaign, which undoubtedly will benefit from the
national notoriety generated by its intercollegiate program.” Id. at 793–94 (citations
omitted). The increasing “growth and visibility of the University of Connecticut . . . has
been based on an intercollegiate basketball-centered strategy,” id. at 796, and the recent
success of the Boise State University football program has conferred similar benefits. Id. at
793. At the same time, the extent to which athletics has diverted university resources from
their core mission has been widely criticized at a variety of institutions. Richard Vedder,
The ‘Arms Race’ in College Sports, STAR TRIBUNE (Dec. 30, 2013, 6:17 PM), http://m
.startribune.com/opinion/?id=238117351; see also Marybeth Gasman, Morris Brown
College: Its Plight, and How it Can Be Saved, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2012, 1:08 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/therootdc/post/morris-brown-college-its-plight-and
-how-it-can-be-saved/2012/08/29/071e3cc4-f1dc-11e1-892d-bc92fee603a7_blog.html;
Kevin Kiley, Fighting too many Fires, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 3, 2013), http://www
.insidehighered.com/news/2013/06/03/rutgers-president-faces-controversy-multiple-fronts
-including-athletics; Grant Wahl & George Dohrmann, Welcome to the Time Big Time,
SI.COM (Nov. 19, 2001), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG102
4363/index.htm.
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and politicians who demand a level of “big-time sports” that their
23
fellow sports fans will not support with their own dollars.
Part I of this Article discusses the tensions on a university’s
educational mission and the adverse effects on student-athletes from
the commercialization of big-time college sports, and the NCAA’s
inability to effectively balance these conflicts consistent with its
constitutional objectives. Part II observes that the professionalization
of commercialized big-time college sports is not a solution that would
further the public interest or student-athletes’ welfare. Part III asserts
that the primary objectives of any reforms should be to ensure that
student-athletes receive the educational benefits that are the hallmark
of the NCAA’s self-professed line of demarcation between
intercollegiate and professional sports.
Parts IV and V explain why neither NCAA internal reforms nor
external reforms imposed by antitrust law, respectively, will solve
these problems. Part VI recommends new federal legislation to
effectively maintain the socially worthy benefits of the
commercial/educational model of intercollegiate athletics for studentathletes and consumers. A key component of this law would be the
establishment of an independent federal regulatory commission,
which would provide an inclusive and transparent rule-making
process readily accessible to all intercollegiate athletics stakeholders
and the public. To ensure that its rules have a reasonable basis, we
propose independent review through arbitration. Although the
commission’s rules would not be legal mandates, their voluntary
adoption by the NCAA and its member institutions would immunize
anticompetitive restraints in connection with big-time college sports
from judicial scrutiny under federal and state antitrust laws.
We conclude by asserting that the prospect of antitrust immunity
should provide the NCAA and its member institutions with a
significant incentive to voluntarily adopt and comply with the
commission’s rules, which would enable the NCAA to fulfill its
23 Ross, Radical Reform, supra note 19, at 940–41; ASS’N OF GOVERNING BDS. OF
UNIVS. & COLLS., TRUST, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND INTEGRITY: BOARD RESPONSIBILITIES
FOR INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 2 (2012), available at http://agb.org/sites/agb.org
/files/KnightReport.pdf (“Although public and independent colleges, universities, and
systems have their own governing boards and enjoy relative autonomy, they seem much
less independent when it comes to intercollegiate sports. Powerful interests that benefit
financially from big-time sports, as well as fans and booster clubs with emotional
investments, can distort the clarity of mind required for effective governance.”). For a
procedural proposal to limit special interest pressure, see text accompanying notes 130–39,
infra.
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constitutional objectives: (1) preserving the line between a
commercial/education model and a commercial/professional model
for intercollegiate sports; (2) enhancing the academic integrity of
intercollegiate athletics; (3) promoting more competitive balance in
big-time intercollegiate sports; and (4) requiring university athletic
departments to operate with fiscal responsibility.
I
TENSIONS CAUSED BY COMMERCIALIZED BIG-TIME COLLEGE
SPORTS
The use of intercollegiate sports by university leaders as part of
their efforts to enable their respective institutions to flourish in an
increasingly competitive higher education environment is a rational
response to marketplace realities. However, this effort to
commercially exploit the entertainment value of big-time football and
men’s basketball has created an inherent tension with other goals that
24
university leaders are urged to pursue. First, the competition for
scarce resources between athletic programs and academic programs
has the potential to distort the university’s core functions of teaching
25
and research. A January 2013 analysis of universities’ academic and
24 See
JOHN CUMMINS & KIRSTEN HEXTRUM, THE MANAGEMENT OF
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS AT UC BERKELEY: TURNING POINTS AND CONSEQUENCES
6 (2013), available at http://cshe.berkeley.edu/publications/management-intercollegiate
-athletics-uc-berkeley-turning-points-and-consequences (“With all the controversy and
conflict surrounding college sports, why do athletic departments continue to enjoy such a
privileged yet problematic position in the academy? While college presidents cite the
camaraderie sports bring to the campus, and the NCAA points to the educational
experience offered to student athletes, many scholars and social critics rightly point to one
reason: the money, or put more accurately, the potential to earn millions of dollars for the
university, a potential rarely realized. It is within this highly commercialized context that
administrators, coaches, campus leaders and alumni ultimately place undue pressure on
student athletes to perform athletically at the expense of their academic work.”).
25 See RAWLINGS PANEL ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF
NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL 3 (Aug. 29, 2013) [hereinafter RAWLINGS PANEL],
available at http://www.ecs.org/html/Document.asp?chouseid=10885. A panel of experts
asked to report to the Chancellor of the University of North Carolina found the following
premise necessary for their recommendations:
Institutions of higher learning exist primarily to discover and to disseminate
knowledge; winning sporting events is peripheral to those basic missions. As a
result, a university’s athletics program must fit within the context of its core
missions, and in no way violate them. Herein lies the principal challenge of
intercollegiate athletics, since an institution’s desire to win must always be
balanced against the core interests of the institution as a whole. Maintain the
integrity of the fundamental missions, and the model works. Fail to maintain
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athletic spending by the Delta Cost Project at the American Institutes
for Research concluded:
The difference between academic and athletic spending among
Division I colleges and universities is striking. Each of the three
subdivisions spent similarly on academics, ranging from roughly
$11,800 to $13,600 per [full time equivalent] student in 2010 . . . .
But among [the 120 big-time football programs], the median
athletic expenditure per athlete was about $92,000, more than six
times the per-student academic expense. Across the [Division I bigtime football programs and non-football] institutions, per-capita
spending was three times higher on athletics as on academics, with
athletic spending per athlete upwards of $36,000 in each [Division
I] subdivision.26

Despite the multibillion dollar revenues collectively generated by
27
big-time football and men’s basketball programs, under certain
accounting conventions relatively few Division I athletic departments
(no more than approximately twenty to twenty-five each year) have
revenues that equal or exceed their respective costs of producing
28
intercollegiate athletics. As a result, university subsidies to Division
I athletic departments are common and may be the norm at many
29
institutions. Even if athletic departments are economically selfintegrity and the potential exists for the model to fail, and to cause serious
damage to the institution.
Id. Although we largely agree with the panel’s articulated premise, their restatement of the
primary purpose of higher education seems to shortchange the experiential aspect of
knowledge dissemination to students. Indeed, accepting this statement might well lead to a
conclusion that big-time sports have no place in higher education. If one believes, as we
do, that winning sporting events provides important life lessons to the participating
student-athletes, creates social cohesion that facilitates learning and professional
advancement for students and alumni, as well as revenue sources that can be tapped to
directly subsidize a university’s core mission, then a more accurate statement is to describe
winning sporting events as potentially complementary to, rather than peripheral to, the
university’s basic objectives.
26 DESROCHERS, supra note 18, at 4.
27 In fiscal year 2010, Division I athletic programs generated $6 billion in revenues. Id.
at 1.
28 DANIEL L. FULKS, NCAA, REVENUES & EXPENSES: 2004–2012 NCAA DIVISION I
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS PROGRAMS REPORT 8, 13 (2013), available at http://www
.ncaapublications.com/p-4306-revenues-and-expenses-2004-2012-ncaa-division-i-inter
collegiate-athletics-programs-report.aspx.
29 Studies finding that big-time college athletics is not financially self-sufficient depend
on several critical accounting assumptions, because universities are not required to follow
any generally accepted accounting principles. Universities typically receive an internal
fund transfer from the athletics program to cover the “cost” of athletic scholarship,
although the marginal cost to major universities of educating student-athletes is a fraction
of that amount, and most institutions would not replace these student-athletes with tuitionpaying non-athletes if athletic scholarships disappeared. If this fund transfer were
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sufficient, there is no self-evident policy reason that football and
men’s basketball surpluses should necessarily be spent on nonrevenue Division I sports as opposed to other university programs.
Second, commercialization of big-time sports has the potential to
overshadow or marginalize the educational aspects of intercollegiate
athletics, particularly for athletes of color who constitute the majority
of athletes playing Division I men’s basketball (58%) and football
30
(46.5%) during the 2012–13 season, thereby blurring the “clear line
of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional
31
sports.” According to the NCAA’s Graduation Success Rate (GSR),
eighty-two percent of Division I student-athletes who entered college
32
for the first time in 2006 graduated within six years. However, the
percentages of men’s basketball players (73%) and football players
33
(71%) who graduated were lower. These sports historically have
discounted, many “money losing” athletic departments would see their balance sheets turn
from red to black. On the other hand, many universities do not “charge” the athletic
department for the actual cost of university facilities, which may mean that some “selfsufficient” athletic programs really are not. For a preliminary discussion of these issues,
see Ross, Radical Reform, supra note 19, at 947.
30 Race and Gender Demographics Search, NCAA.ORG, http://web1.ncaa.org/rgd
Search/exec/saSearch (select academic year “2012-2013,” “Division I,” and “Basketball”
or “Football”; then follow “View Report”) (last visited Jan. 28, 2014).
31 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 1.3.1.
32 Allie Grasgreen, Athletes Grad Rates Back Up, INSIDE HIGHER ED, (Oct. 25, 2013),
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/10/25/after-slight-dip-athletes-graduation-rates
-back.
33 Id. This phenomenon exists even at some of America’s most academically elite
universities. A recent analysis of the graduation rates of student-athletes who entered the
University of California-Berkeley from 1998–2005 concluded:
The graduation rate for UC Berkeley’s revenue generating teams are the lowest
in the department. Men’s basketball went four years with none of their
scholarship student athletes graduating. This brought down their average to a
58% graduation rate over this eight year period. Football also has sub-par
graduation rates. Over the past eight years, football graduation rates have ranged
from a high of 72% to a low of 31%. Football has the lowest average team
graduation rate with only 50% of their scholarship athletes graduating. The
numbers are even more grim when broken down by race. In particular, the black
scholarship football players, many of whom are special admits, have gone from a
high of 80% to a low of 18%. The NCAA also tracks graduation rates by
compiling four-year averages to even-out any anomalies. In this data set, the
black graduation rates range from a high of 63% to a low of 30%. Three of the
seven four-year averages mark the black graduation rate in the 30s. . . . On the
whole, the student athlete graduation rates are commendable. These students face
additional pressures, time commitments, and schedule conflicts that are in many
ways unique to the student athlete subculture. Yet when the graduation rates are
disaggregated by race, gender, and sport, a different picture emerges, particularly
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had the lowest graduation rates for all NCAA sports, and 2013 was
the first year in which both sports had a graduation rate of more than
34
seventy percent. Moreover, the graduation rates for black basketball
35
players (68%) and black football players (64%) were even lower.
Third, in light of contemporary economic realities—including the
NCAA’s $11 billion men’s basketball tournament television
36
contract, the more than $100 million in annual revenues raised by
37
several athletic departments, and coaches’ multimillion dollar
38
salaries —the current structure results in significant economic
exploitation of elite Division I football and men’s basketball players,
without whose efforts these revenues would not be possible.
Moreover, schools have increased expenditures on facilities and
training for athletes designed to enhance their potential for winning
games now and for a professional career later, while insisting on time
for black male revenue athletes. These abysmal retention rates for black male
revenue athletes illustrate that the most visible students of the athletic department
are failing to earn a degree from UC Berkeley.
Cummins & Hextrum, supra note 24, at 20.
34 Grasgreen, supra note 32. After a recent scandal involving fake classes, members of
the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill staff have admitted to loosening academic
standards for athletes. Sara Ganim, UNC: We Failed Students ‘For Years,’ CNN (Jan. 29,
2014, 1:36 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2014/01/28/us/ncaa-athletes-unc/index.html?hpt
=us_c2.
35 Grasgreen, supra note 32.
36 Richard Sandomir & Pete Thamel, TV Deal Pushes N.C.A.A. Closer to 68-Team
Tournament, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/23/sports/ncaa
basketball/23ncaa.html?_r=0.
37 See College: Finances, USA TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college
/schools/finances/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2014).
38 College: Salaries, USA TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/salaries/
(last visited Jan. 28, 2014). A brief word here is in order to respond to those who advocate
an antitrust immunity to permit NCAA schools to limit salaries for coaches. See Brad
Wolverton, Watchdog Group’s Proposal Calls for Antitrust Exemption for NCAA,
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC. (Oct. 11, 2013), http://chronicle.com/blogs/players
/watchdog-groups-proposal-calls-for-antitrust-exemption-for-ncaa/33711. We see no
public policy justification for asking successful college coaches to disproportionately
shoulder the burden of funding socially worthy causes such as non-revenue sports or a
university’s teaching and research programs. The University of Alabama’s multimillion
dollar investment in Nick Saban’s salary, College: Salaries, supra, seems to us to be just
as prudent as the University of Michigan’s multimillion dollar investment in expanding
Michigan Stadium. See Adam Jacobi, Michigan AD: 120,000-Seat Stadium a Possibility,
CBSSPORTS.COM (May 26, 2011, 6:10 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/mcc/blogs/entry
/24156338/29601474. To be sure, for a university to spend excessively to hire or retain a
coach where funding is not being generated by the coaches’ own team raises different
policy questions. But we see no basis to distinguish a university’s imprudent expenditure
on a football coach from a university’s imprudent decision to operate multiple sports at the
Division I level.

MITTEN (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

6/12/2014 12:17 PM

A Regulatory Solution to Better Promote the Educational Values
and Economic Sustainability of Intercollegiate Athletics

849

commitments analogous to full-time employment as a condition of an
39
athletic scholarship. These demands make it difficult to sustain the
claim that athletes playing for nationally-prominent programs do so
40
primarily for the intrinsic benefits of athletics participation.
Fourth, even if a significant majority of big-time football and
basketball players are not economically exploited—because the
educational opportunities provided by an athletic scholarship along
with an intercollegiate platform for developing their playing skills
into a potential professional sports career is a fair trade for their
services—many believe that the current system, with its
comparatively lower graduation rates for these athletes, results in a
41
socially undesirable exploitation of athletes. These athletes ought to
receive education and training for academic success, as they are
statistically much more likely to turn pro in something other than
42
sports.
For a variety of reasons (structural ones are discussed below in Part
V), the NCAA has neither effectively nor fairly accommodated these
tensions as big-time athletics have become increasingly
commercialized. This trend has led to an “arms race” of expenditures:
(1) the top schools capable of earning nine-figure revenues spend
millions on coaches, facilities, recruiting, and a variety of other things
to maintain status in football and basketball; (2) other schools
increase expenditures, even without the surpluses generated by the
biggest programs, to try to keep up; (3) athletic directors with the
professional and ideological incentive to promote broad-based
intercollegiate programs use increased profits to subsidize or provide
larger budgets for non-revenue sports; (4) non-revenue sport
programs adopt the competitive mind-sets of big-time football and
men’s basketball programs in terms of demands to win and

39 Although 1991 NCAA legislation prohibits universities from requiring studentathletes to spend more than twenty hours a week in connection with their respective sports,
a 2010 survey found that Division I football and men’s basketball players reported
spending substantially more time on required and voluntary sport-related activities (43.3
and 39 hours a week respectively), which is more time than they spent on academic
endeavors. RAWLINGS PANEL, supra note 25, at 14.
40 Id.
41 See, e.g., Powell, supra note 7, at 243.
42 Only 1.2% of NCAA men’s basketball players and 0.9% of NCAA football players
go on to play professionally. Probability of Competing Beyond High School, NCAA.ORG,
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/probability-competing-beyond-high-school
(last updated Sept. 2013).
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impositions on the time commitments for student-athletes; and (5)
few universities seriously consider whether funds invested in
intercollegiate athletics would be better spent on teaching and
research or other aspects of its respective academic missions. The
NCAA has neither determined that these multimillion dollar
44
expenditures meet its own constitutional goal of prudent investment
in intercollegiate athletics, nor has it taken any steps to correct this
development. Indeed, the NCAA has no detailed regulations
45
enforcing this constitutional principle.
Despite the multibillion dollar revenues generated annually by bigtime sports, the economic value of the permissible benefits provided
to big-time football and men’s basketball players remains capped at a
level several thousand dollars below the actual full cost of
46
attendance. Increased sport-related time demands preclude any
meaningful ability for poor student-athletes to seek part-time
employment to enable them to have access to the funds available to
47
most of their nonathlete classmates.
Superstar athletes who
nevertheless comply with NCAA prohibitions against the receipt of
48
“extra benefit[s]” despite receiving no or little family financial
support, experience a lifestyle far below that of most of their
classmates and almost all the fans who are entertained by their
athletic performance. Absent NCAA rules restricting their ability to
receive any economic benefits other than the value of a full athletic
scholarship (i.e., tuition, fees, room, board, and books), these athletes
likely would earn substantial economic rewards based on their

43 This may occur even at America’s most academically elite universities. Cummins &
Hextrum, supra note 24, at 2 (observing that UC Berkeley’s twenty-seven varsity sports
other than football and men’s basketball “are also vulnerable to the current commercial
pressures in college sports. For example, the Pac-12 television network will now offer
coverage of Olympic sports”).
44 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 2.16.
45 See id.
46 Id. §§ 2.13, 15, 15.1.1 (excepting Pell Grants from the total financial aid allowed for
athletes); Federal Pell Grants, FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://studentaid
.ed.gov/types/grants-scholarships/pell (last visited Jan. 28, 2014) (“The maximum Federal
Pell Grant award is $5,645 for the 2013–14 award year . . . .”); Tyson Hartnett, Why
College Athletes Should Be Paid, HUFF POST (Oct. 21, 2013, 7:41 PM), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/tyson-hartnett/college-athletes-should-be-paid_b_4133847.html;
Jason Kirk, No, College Football Players Aren’t Unionizing for Pay-for-Play, SB NATION
(Jan. 28, 2014, 6:43 PM), http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2014/1/28/5354718
/college-football-players-union-pay-for-play.
47 See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 12.4.
48 Id. § 16.11.2.2.
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49

intercollegiate athletics accomplishments and fame.
However,
college athletes currently cannot unionize and engage in
multiemployer collective bargaining on a national basis with all
NCAA Division I universities producing “big-time” men’s basketball
and football for more favorable contract terms, despite a recent
determination by the Chicago regional office of the National Labor
Relations Board that Northwestern University scholarship football
50
players are university employees. Moreover, courts generally will
not imply additional, more favorable terms despite this disparity of
51
bargaining power.
Throughout society, and particularly among those who consume
and set policy for intercollegiate sports, there is a widely accepted
view that the public interest is furthered by a system in which college
football and basketball players are student-athletes who are expected
to strive for excellence in both academics and athletics, unlike
professional athletes whose sole focus is on the latter objective. As
former Ohio State football coach Woody Hayes said:
The coach will squeeze every bit of football from each player that
he can, but in return the coach must give that man every legitimate
measure of help he needs to get ‘the rest’ of his education. . . . we
feel that the man who plays college football and does not graduate
has been cheated.52

Based on NCAA graduation rates for Division I men’s basketball
(73%) and FBS football players (71%), more than one-quarter of
49 Players like Johnny “Football” Manziel are incredibly marketable. One endorsement
company believes a single tweet would earn Manziel nearly $3500. Kavitha A. Davidson,
Johnny Football Is More Gronk Than Brady, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Jan. 9, 2014, 5:28 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-09/johnny-football-is-more-gronk-than-brady
.html. Upon being drafted by the Broncos, NCAA sensation Tim Tebow realized his
endorsement value was worth tens of millions of dollars. Tim Tebow Says He Has Turned
down ‘Seven-Figure’ Endorsement Deals, HUFF POST (May 3, 2010, 8:17 PM, updated
May 25, 2011, 5:30 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/13/tim-tebow-says-he
-has-tur_n_575761.html.
50 Northwestern University and College Athletes Players Association, 13-RC-121359
(N.L.R.B. Region 13, Mar. 26, 2014), available at http://www.espn.go.com/pdf/2014
/0326/espn_uniondecision.PDF. The National Labor Relations Act applies only to private
employers (e.g., Northwestern, a private university), not the public universities (e.g., The
Ohio State University) that constitute the vast majority of the NCAA’s 351 Division I
members. List of NCAA Division I Institutions, WIKIPEDIA.COM, http://en.wikipedia.org
/wiki/List_of _NCAA_Division_I_institutions (last updated Mar. 31, 2014, 3:37 PM).
51 See, e.g., Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992); Jackson v. Drake
Univ., 778 F. Supp. 1490 (S.D. Iowa 1991).
52 W. WOODROW HAYES, YOU WIN WITH PEOPLE! 12 (1973).
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53

them do not graduate within six years of entering college.
Approximately one-third of black basketball and football players
(32% and 36% respectively) do not earn a degree within this time
54
frame. Thus, these student-athletes are being cheated under the view
55
espoused by former coach Hayes. Although NCAA regulations
requiring student-athletes to make genuine academic progress towards
56
a degree
and denying postseason eligibility to schools with
57
unacceptably low graduation rates in a sport address past systemic
abuses and attempt to maintain the academic integrity of
intercollegiate athletics (particularly big-time sports), significant
problems remain. In particular, the current system of commercialized
big-time sports fails to acknowledge, much less to effectively address,
that both universities and student-athletes (many of whom are
teenagers) have an incentive to focus unduly on short-term goals,
such as a winning season or a future professional career, instead of
the long-term benefits of earning a college degree.

53

Grasgreen, supra note 32.
Id.
55 In chapter 6 of his Ph.D. dissertation, which is titled “The Role of Education in
Pursuing the Dream of a Professional Football Career,” former NFL player George
Koonce, writes:
The [former college football] players interviewed in this study had high
expectations regarding their identities as college students but were surprised to
find they were not taken seriously as students or young scholars. They were often
let off the hook when it came to participation in classes; thus, they began to feel
that little was expected of them when it came to school. They were merely
athletes. Though they were told to go to classes and to participate in study halls,
they began to understand that they were being made to feel secure about their
academic behaviors and achievements when perhaps they should not have felt so.
The coaching staff determined their schedules, and then, exhausted by practices,
the athletes could not truly keep up with their schoolwork. They found
themselves going from feeling optimistic to being overwhelmed when it came to
school. They noticed that other athletes around them were not motivated when it
came to school and eventually, they too disengaged from academics.
George Earl Koonce, Jr., Role Transition of National Football League Retired Athletes: A
Grounded Theory Approach 105–06 (May 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Marquette University) (on file with author).
56 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
57 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 14.02.1; Adam Himmelsbach, UCONN is Among
Those Barred from Postseason Basketball, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes
.com/2012/06/21/sports/ncaabasketball/uconn-basketball-is-among-those-to-receive-post
season-ban.html?_r=0.
54
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II
PROFESSIONALIZATION OF COMMERCIALIZED COLLEGE SPORTS IS
NOT THE SOLUTION
The appropriate response to the multibillion dollar
commercialization of big-time football and men’s basketball is not
professionalization of those who participate in these sports. North
American
professional
sports
operate
on
a
purely
commercial/professional model, with dominant sports leagues
controlled by individual clubs owned by investors seeking to
58
maximize their profits. Although, like these sports, big-time college
football and basketball are enormously popular forms of
entertainment with very substantial commercial value, they should not
be based on the commercial profit-maximizing model characteristic of
professional sports.
First, even from a purely commercial perspective, it is unclear
whether any institutions would benefit from operating a professional
model. The quality of play in college football and men’s basketball is
far below that of the National Football League and National
Basketball Association, and is more akin to a far less commercially
59
successful professional sport, such as minor league baseball. Absent
clear product differentiation from professional sports, college sports
might lose a significant portion of their audience. Moreover, output
might be substantially reduced if the many schools currently offering
big-time football were required to fully compete in a labor market for
the services of talented intercollegiate players.
Second, adoption of the professional model would create numerous
60
61
legal issues for schools, such as tax liability, labor, and workers’

58 This is in model contrast to the European model of sport, where professional sports
leagues are often composed of and operated by “win maximizing” clubs, Stefan Kesenne,
Revenue Sharing and Competitive Balance in Professional Team Sports, 1 J. SPORTS
ECON. 56 (2000), and all sports are under an integrated pyramid subject to regulation by a
national governing board as part of an international federation. See generally James A.R.
Nafziger, European and North American Models of Sports Organization, in HANDBOOK
ON INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW 88–111 (James A.R. Nafziger & Stephen F. Ross eds.,
2011).
59 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. (Board of
Regents), 468 U.S. 85, 101–02 (1984).
60 See generally John D. Colombo, The NCAA, Tax Exemption, and College Athletics,
2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 109.
61 See generally Michael H. LeRoy, An Invisible Union for an Invisible Labor Market:
College Football and the Union Substitution Effect, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 1077.
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compensation. These legal issues do not arise if intercollegiate
athletics is operated as an integral part of the university’s educational
program.
The demands of big-time football and men’s basketball
(particularly in-season) require significantly more time than an
avocation, and virtually all participants receive an athletic scholarship
63
(a form of pay for play) that negates any true “amateur” status.
Nevertheless, students’ participation in intercollegiate athletics should
not be motivated solely or primarily by economic rewards as is the
case with professional athletes. If elite young athletes are going to
participate in a professional sports competition, public policy
certainly does not dictate that competitions be organized by major
universities rather than professional enterprises. In contrast, there is a
public policy justification for preferring the intercollegiate athletics
model to the minor league professional sports model. College sports
provide a large number of athletes, who recognize that the probability
of a successful future professional sports career is low, with the
opportunity to leverage their athletic abilities into academic
achievement that might otherwise be unavailable to them.
To be sure, some athletically-gifted young men may participate in
big-time football or men’s basketball solely as a platform to enhance
their future professional playing prospects, exhibiting a short-sighted
disregard for the objective reality that the probability of a successful
64
professional sports career is low. Ideally, these athletes would have
65
the option of pursuing a professional career immediately, or
selecting a mixed-model of intercollegiate athletes (neither strictly
66
amateur
nor fully professional) in which they can develop
62 See generally Michael J. Mondello & Joseph Beckham, Workers’ Compensation and
Collegiate Athletes: The Debate over the Pay for Play Model: A Counterpoint, 31 J.L. &
EDUC. 293 (2002).
63 See generally Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 191 S.E.2d 379 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972)
(holding that the NCAA academic requirements constituted the only standard for
measuring academic success and a student who refused to participate in practice to
improve academic performance violated his contractual obligation to the University and
lost his scholarship).
64 Probability of Competing Beyond High School, supra note 42.
65 Clearly, elite baseball and hockey players can choose between developing their skills
through minor league professional sports and intercollegiate athletics. Increasingly,
basketball players can make the same choice, either through the NBA’s Development
League, Frequently Asked Questions, NBA DEV. LEAGUE, https://dleaguetryouts.nba.com
/FAQs.aspx (last visited Jan. 30, 2014), or by playing professionally overseas.
66 Richard T. Karcher, The Battle Outside of the Courtroom: Principles of
“Amateurism” vs. Principles of Supply and Demand, 3 MISS. SPORTS L. REV. 1, 2
(forthcoming 2014) (“In essence, ‘amateurism’ is nothing more than a term designating a
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athletically as well as educationally. When there is no alternative
67
option, as is currently the case with NFL football, society must
choose whether to organize big-time college football under the
commercial/educational model or the commercial/professional model.
Selecting the former because it promotes wider educational access for
many seems justified, even at the risk of making some paternalistic
choices for those who prefer not to take advantage of educational
opportunities that are mandated by the model.
III
A BETTER ALTERNATIVE: ENSURING STUDENT-ATHLETES IN
COMMERCIALIZED SPORTS ACTUALLY RECEIVE THE BENEFITS THAT
DISTINGUISH INTERCOLLEGIATE AND PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
Intercollegiate football and men’s basketball players generally
devote more time to their sports and have lower graduation rates than
68
We believe a preferred policy
other intercollegiate athletes.
alternative is to ensure that these student-athletes receive the
educational, physical, mental, and social benefits that schools ought to
provide them, in return for their commercially successful participation
in commercialized intercollegiate athletics. This approach is more
consistent with the economic and social benefits of retaining
intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of a university’s
educational program. These benefits are likely to be more
economically beneficial to student-athletes in the long term than
compensating them with cash for their playing services (like
professional athletes), as a free-market antitrust-driven approach may
69
require.

business model. ‘Principles of amateurism’ mean whatever the NCAA says they mean,
and they apply whenever the NCAA says they apply.”).
67 Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 143 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that the
NFL’s rule requiring a player to be three years removed from high school before becoming
draft eligible does not violate antitrust law and adding that the union can create standards
for its members).
68 See RAWLINGS PANEL, supra note 25, at 12.
69 Empirical studies have found that former male intercollegiate athletes earn higher
annual incomes on average than otherwise similar nonathletes in non-sports careers.
Daniel J. Henderson, Alexandre Olbrecht & Solomon W. Polachek, Do Former College
Athletes Earn More at Work?, 41 J. HUM. RESOURCES 558 (2006); James E. Long &
Steven B. Caudill, The Impact of Participation in Intercollegiate Athletics on Income and
Graduation, 73 REV. ECON. & STAT. 525 (1991).
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Although NCAA academic reforms have minimized egregious
examples of exploitation of individual student-athletes such as Dexter
71
72
Manley and Kevin Ross, the prevailing commercialized model of
big-time sports remains inconsistent with the fundamental NCAA
principle that athletes “should be protected from exploitation by . . .
73
commercial enterprises.”
We parse the NCAA’s governing
principles to acknowledge the fundamental economic reality that
major universities are themselves “commercial enterprises” when
74
promoting football and men’s basketball. If we consider why a
university would expect a student-athlete to forego part-time
employment and commit forty or more hours per week in-season to
intercollegiate athletics, certainly one answer is the commercial
benefit to the university from offering big-time sports. Many studentathletes are so multi-talented that they can excel at all aspects of
75
college life.
However, some student-athletes struggling
70

See supra notes 56–57.
Dexter Manley, a former NFL football player, admitted that he never learned to read
despite spending four years in college while playing football for Oklahoma State
University. Dexter Manley, Until He Tackled His Illiteracy, the Redskins’ Gridiron Terror
Lived in Fear of the ABC’s, PEOPLE (Sept. 25, 1989, 1:00 AM), http://www.people.com
/people/article/0,,20121269,00.html.
72 Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 412 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining that Ross
earned a D average in his classes and attended a year of remedial education with grade
school children before he could no longer afford additional education).
73 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 2.9.
74 Under an alternative parsing of the NCAA principle, even if universities are per se
excluded from the description of “commercial enterprises,” a university that promotes a
level of commercialism so that it can receive revenue from corporate sponsors or
television rights sales is failing to protect student-athletes from exploitation from these
organizations.
75 See, e.g., Campbell Trophy Winner Urschel to be Honored at BCS National
Championship, PENN STATE (Jan. 6, 2014), http://news.psu.edu/story/299261/2014/01/06
/academics/campbell-trophy-winner-urschel-be-honored-bcs-national. John Urschel, a
two-time All-Big Ten offensive lineman and 2013 Third Team All-American football
player at Penn State, received the Campbell Trophy awarded to the outstanding scholarathlete for combining his on-field success with academic excellence including serving as
an instructor during football season for his senior year (he had already graduated) and
securing publication of an article in Celestial Mechanics and Dynamic Astronomy and
another paper in the journal Communications in Mathematical Finance. Id. As another
example, in 2014, Ohio State senior guard Aaron Craft, who holds the Big Ten career
record for steals, was selected as the Defensive Player of the Year by the National
Association of Basketball Coaches and honored as the Capital One Academic All-America
of the Year for Division I men's basketball. Ari Wasserman, Aaron Craft Named the
Defensive Player of the Year by the National Association of Basketball Coaches,
CLEVELAND.COM (Apr. 4, 2014, 6:14 AM), http://www.cleveland.com/osu/index.ssf
/2014/04/aaron_craft_named_the_defensiv.html; Doug Lesmerises, Ohio State's Aaron
Craft Named College Basketball's Academic All-America of the Year, CLEVELAND.COM
71
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academically would likely focus on short-term professional success
by foregoing the benefits of a college degree for some marginal
improvement on the gridiron or court. Thus, colleges and universities
that insist upon such a commitment can be fairly characterized as
exploiting these athletes in order to advance their own commercial
interests.
Public policy suggests, then, that reform proposals acknowledge
that long-term interests are not served by the short-term “bargain”
between ostensibly “student-athletes” focused primarily on their
professional careers and college athletic programs that value their
services. Rather, as we detail in Part VI, a better alternative is reform
that creates programs designed to ensure that student-athletes
participating in big-time sports receive the fullest opportunity to gain
the benefits that a college education can offer.
IV
NCAA INTERNAL REFORM—BY ITS ECONOMICALLY SELFINTERESTED MEMBER UNIVERSITIES—WILL NOT EFFECTIVELY
RESOLVE THE PROBLEM
One of us has previously detailed the inherent structural problems
when economically self-interested members govern a dominant
professional sporting competition and make the rules governing the
sport. These members may adopt rules for the best interest of the
competition as a whole, but may use their power over economic
relationships between themselves and with third parties to further
76
their own narrow, parochial self-interest. These problems are
exacerbated in the case of the NCAA, an organization with
monolithic power to govern big-time intercollegiate sports, which
must not only balance the varied economic goals of its more than
1000 members, but also pursue noneconomic values that justify the
anticompetitive effects of its rules and governance decisions. As Tom
McMillen, a former United States Representative and University of
Maryland and NBA basketball star, observed, “[t]here is just too

(Feb. 21, 2013, 5:29 PM) http://www.cleveland.com/osu/index.ssf/2013/02/ohio_states
_aaron_craft_named_1.html.
76 See generally STEPHEN F. ROSS & STEFAN SZYMANSKI, FANS OF THE WORLD
UNITE! A (CAPITALIST) MANIFESTO FOR SPORTS CONSUMERS (2008).
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much money involved in the multibillion-dollar industry that is
77
college athletics to expect the participants to police themselves.”
Consider the NCAA constitutional principle promoting competitive
78
equity in athletics among member schools. As any fan of the
University of California Golden Bears football team (its last Rose
79
Bowl visit was 1959) can attest, the NCAA obviously does not
promote strict parity among individual athletic conferences, much less
among all Division I universities that compete in big-time football or
men’s basketball. Indiana University’s president no doubt has a
different view on the desirable extent of competitive equity in
intercollegiate athletics (at least regarding football) than his Ohio
State University counterpart. Even if NCAA Division I member
universities could reach an agreement on competitive equity, it is
unrealistic to expect them to appropriately resolve the conflict
between this objective, which promotes fan interest in intercollegiate
athletics, and the NCAA constitutional principle that student-athletes
should not be exploited. This is especially apparent given that the five
Division I power conferences advocate increasing the value of an
80
athletic scholarships to the full cost of university attendance. Not
surprisingly, other Division I member schools with fewer commercial
opportunities overrode this proposed NCAA legislation, primarily
based on economic concerns regarding the increased costs of
81
providing competitive intercollegiate athletic programs.
Self-governing organizations also struggle to solve problems
relating to wasteful expenditures. For example, in all likelihood the
University of Oregon would have vigorously opposed rules barring its
82
new training and locker facilities, while Ohio State University
77 C. Thomas McMillen, Accountability on the Quad, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/01/opinion/how-to-referee-college-sports.html.
78 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 2.10.
79 Jeff Faraudo, New Cal Football Coach Sonny Dykes Talks Rose Bowl Goal, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Dec. 6, 2012, 3:54 PM), http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_221
40817/new-cal-coach-sonny-dykes-talks-rose-bowl.
80 Andy Staples, Full-Cost-of-Attendance Scholarship Debate Could Break up the FBS,
SI.COM (Mar. 8, 2012, 10:04 AM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2012/writers/andy
_staples/03/08/presidents-scholarships/.
81 Id.
82 See Tom Ley, Oregon’s New “Football Performance Center” Is a Decadent
Monstrosity, DEADSPIN.COM (July 31, 2013), http://deadspin.com/oregons-new-football
-performance-center-is-a-decaden-975295515; Daniel Uthman, Stunning Amenities in
Oregon’s New Football Facility, USA TODAY (Aug. 1, 2013, 1:28 AM), http://www.usa
today.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2013/08/01/outrageously-unique-amenities-in-oregons-new
-football-facility-hatfield-dowlin-complex/2606223/.
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83

would likely oppose limits on its use of private jets for recruiting. In
contrast, observers give significant weight to NASCAR’s
independence from the racing teams for that sport’s success in
limiting automotive engineering expenditures that would result in vast
84
costs with minimal benefit to consumers. Consistent with this view,
the Supreme Court has recognized that limiting competition among
retailers of a product is often anticompetitive when the limits are
produced by agreement among the retailers, but often promotes
competition when the limits are imposed on retailers pursuant to a
85
policy adopted by a separate firm such as the manufacturer.
Like numerous other American voluntary membership
associations, the NCAA is a private organization whose members
have significant authority and freedom to make and enforce their own
86
rules. However, unlike members of the Moose Lodge who can join
another similar group such as the Elks if they are unhappy with its
rules, those dissatisfied with NCAA regulations cannot simply quit
and join another co-equal national body that governs intercollegiate
athletics. This important principle was judicially recognized in
England over half a century ago (before the United Kingdom enacted
effective competition or employment discrimination laws), in a
challenge to a regulation by another private organization—the Jockey
87
Club—that barred female trainers. The eminent British jurist Lord
Denning held that the common law needed to evolve to condemn the
male-only regulation because there was a broader public interest
88
when a sporting organization exercises dominance in the field.
Just as the Jockey Club of the “Mad Men” era excluded women,
the NCAA, if free from external constraint, would continue to shortchange the long-term welfare of student-athletes. The most recent
controversy, where modest additional benefits (a small stipend for

83

See Ross, Radical Reform, supra note 19, at 953–54.
ROBERT G. HAGSTROM, THE NASCAR WAY: THE BUSINESS THAT DRIVES THE
SPORT 35–37 (1998).
85 Compare United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 130 (1966)
(agreement by retail car dealers to pressure General Motors to cease supply to discount
rival was unlawful), with Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 56–58
(1977) (television manufacturer’s policy limiting number of authorized retailers in major
markets was lawful unless evidence demonstrably showed harmful effects).
86 See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 183 (1988)
(describing the NCAA).
87 See Nagle v. Feilden, [1966] 2 Q.B. 633 (Eng.).
88 Id.
84
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spending money and other expenses that many universities include in
nonathletic aid in determining the full cost of an education) were
rejected, largely because of the parochial self-interest of some
member schools (who did not want to bear the additional cost),
demonstrates that the NCAA structure inhibits policies that redress
student-athlete exploitation. In addition, the NCAA’s track record
with regard to the interests of other stakeholders establishes a clear
and predictable pattern: reforms that address public interest concerns
take a back seat to the status quo when a significant number of
89
member schools’ economic interests would be adversely affected.
Because the NCAA is a private organization, the NCAA has no duty
to articulate precisely why it has balanced its conflicting goals in the
manner it has chosen.
If there is a public interest in maintaining big-time intercollegiate
athletics, by ensuring that the commercialized aspects of the sport
coexist with noncommercial aspects that provide educational benefits
to participating student-athletes, as well as economic and cultural
benefits to the rest of the university community, reform must come
90
from a source external to the NCAA. To date, the NCAA’s critics
have sought reform through innovative attempts to use contract law to
91
challenge perceived unfairness in NCAA rules and by launching
89 For example, prior to the external restraint of an antitrust judgment in Board of
Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 135–36 (1984), the NCAA exploited consumers by limiting access
to football games; after the judgment, the number of games tripled in one year. PAUL C.
WEILER ET AL., SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXT, CASES AND PROBLEMS 888 (4th ed. 2011).
Likewise, without regard for any coherent justification based on its unique role in
managing college athletics, the NCAA exploited college assistant coaches by limiting their
salaries. Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1013–15 (10th Cir. 1998).
90 Daniel E. Lazaroff, An Antitrust Exemption for the NCAA: Sound Policy or Letting
the Fox Loose in the Henhouse?, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 229, 246 (2014) (advocating that any
NCAA antitrust immunity should be “subject to independent regulatory oversight” to
ensure that “the NCAA would not be able to act solely in its own economic interest,” but
concluding that “it is difficult to articulate just what agency or oversight body would be
capable of taking on the enormous task”). We agree with the need for independent
regulatory oversight as a condition of NCAA antitrust immunity, while proposing federal
legislation that would establish a regulatory regime for furthering the legitimate objectives
of the commercial/education model of big-time intercollegiate athletics. See infra Part VI.
91 A number of state courts have creatively applied the contract law doctrine of third
party beneficiaries to judicially review the particular application of an NCAA rule to an
individual student or coach. This doctrine, especially where combined with the court’s
refusal to enforce NCAA rules that violate public policy, can be effective in some limited
contexts. See, e.g., Oliver v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 920 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio Ct.
C.P. 2009) (refusing to enforce NCAA rule barring baseball player selected in a
professional draft from consulting an attorney in the next room in evaluating whether to
turn pro). However, another leading case indicates the limits of this doctrine. Bloom v.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 93 P.3d 621 (Colo. App. 2004) was a substantive
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92

antitrust actions against specific NCAA policies. As we explain
below, antitrust law appropriately requires commercial firms to
compete with a principal focus on enhancing welfare for paying
customers, while failing to meaningfully deal with ways in which
non-commercial firms may act contrary to the public interest. Because
our model for big-time college sports does not seek a purely
commercial approach, antitrust challenges are a highly imprecise
means of demanding reform. We discuss antitrust law and its limits in
the following two Parts.
V
ALTHOUGH NCAA SCHOOLS HAVE MONOPSONY POWER IN THE
MARKET FOR “BIG-TIME SPORTS PLAYING SERVICES,” ANTITRUST
LAW DOES NOT PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE SOLUTION THAT
ACCOMMODATES THE PUBIC INTEREST IN CONTINUING UNIVERSITY
PARTICIPATION IN COMMERCIALIZED INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORTS
One strategy for remedying the economic exploitation of studentathletes by commercialized college sports programs has been to
challenge NCAA regulations under the federal antitrust laws. For a
93
variety of reasons, we believe that use of the Sherman Act is an illfitting solution to these problems. The Supreme Court has recognized
that the Sherman Act was primarily designed to focus on for-profit

challenge to NCAA regulations that permit student-athletes to retain eligibility in one sport
whilst turning pro in another sport, but barring endorsement income. In this case, a
member of the Colorado Buffalos football squad was a professional skier, barred from
endorsing skis. Id. at 622. However, contract law theory did not allow him to prevail,
because the “contract” itself—the NCAA rules—explicitly prohibited the income he
sought to receive. Id. at 627. As these cases illustrate, contract law is ineffective in barring
rules that are not really necessary to maintain the commercial/education model and
worthless in mandating specific reforms to improve the model.
92 See, e.g., Smith v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998)
(rejecting challenge to rule barring players from playing as graduate students at a second
university); Banks v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992)
(rejecting challenge to rules barring players from signing with agents or submitting name
for professional draft); McCormack v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th
Cir. 1988) (rejecting challenge to suspension of Southern Methodist University football
team for widespread cash payments to players); O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, No. C 09-3329CW, 2010 WL 445190 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010) (rejecting pretrial
efforts to dismiss challenge to NCAA rule requiring players to waive in perpetuity all
publicity rights for performing for a university). See also Jenkins v. Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, No. 3:14-cv-01678, (D.N.J., filed Mar. 17, 2014) (alleging the NCAA cap
on economic value of athletic scholarships violates §1 of Sherman Act).
93 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012).
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commercial enterprises and that antitrust analysis must account for
the unusual contexts in which nonprofit entities engage in and
94
potentially restrain trade. However, antitrust law is not well-suited
for case-by-case judicial application to an industry characterized by
pro- and anticompetitive trade restraints where a widely-accepted
social goal is the use of monopoly profits for worthy causes. This is
precisely the commercial/education model that describes big-time
95
college sports.
In a 1984 case, National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board
96
of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, a majority of the
Supreme Court, having rejected the dissent’s contention that
amateurism justified any commercial restraint by NCAA member
schools, identified a procompetitive economic justification for a
variety of NCAA regulations: product differentiation. The Court then
proceeded to pronounce that “athletes must not be paid, must be
97
required to attend class, and the like.” The Court provided no
empirical support for the assertion that these rules were necessary to
98
“preserve the character and quality of the ‘product.’”
Since then, lower courts have mimicked this approach by rejecting
various challenges to rules justified by the NCAA as promoting
amateurism and maintaining the clear line of demarcation from
professional sports without any serious consideration as to if and how
the precise rule in question actually served the product differentiation
goal articulated by the Supreme Court. Under current antitrust law,
courts have ruled that a broad range of NCAA rules designed to
preserve amateurism are legal regardless of any adverse effects on
student-athletes’ economic interests, including rules prohibiting any
price competition among universities or payment of fair market wages
for their athletic services or forbidding student-athletes to receive any
99
athletics-related pecuniary benefits from nonfamily third parties.
94

See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
For this reason, detailed in the text to follow, our proposal meets the standard for
exemption recommended by the Antitrust Modernization Commission: “competition
cannot achieve important societal goals that trump consumer welfare.” ANTITRUST
MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION viii (2007).
96 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984).
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 See, e.g., Justice v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz.
1983); see also Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328, 344–45 (7th Cir.
2012) (“It is not until payment above and beyond educational costs is received that a
player is considered a ‘paid athlete.’ . . . The NCAA’s limitation on athlete compensation
beyond educational expenses . . . directly advances the goal of maintaining a ‘clear line of
95
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One of us has previously observed that courts’ reliance upon the
amateur/education model of intercollegiate athletics to summarily
reject student-athletes’ antitrust challenges to NCAA amateurism
eligibility rules is inconsistent with the current economic realities of
100
big-time football and men’s basketball.
Courts should recognize
that the commercial/education model applies to big-time college
football and men’s basketball. In a 2013 case, In re NCAA StudentAthlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation (O’Bannon), a federal
judge did so by rejecting the NCAA’s argument that all of its
amateurism rules are per se legal as a matter of law, regardless of
whether they have anticompetitive effects in a properly defined
101
relevant market. A group of current and former football and men’s
basketball student-athletes alleged that the NCAA violated federal
antitrust law by conspiring with Electronic Arts and Collegiate
Licensing Company (who previously settled their claims) to restrain
competition in the market for the commercial use of their names,
102
images, and likenesses “in game footage or in videogames.”
The
court rejected the NCAA’s argument that the athletes’ claims were
“nothing more than a challenge to the NCAA’s rules on amateurism”
and therefore must be dismissed under Board of Regents, which stated
in dicta that “[i]n order to preserve the character and quality of the
103
NCAA’s ‘product,’ athletes must not be paid.”
On the other hand, not all NCAA rules designed to maintain the
amateur nature of intercollegiate sports, or more appropriately the
unique brand of college sports, have the requisite anticompetitive
effects necessary to subject them to antitrust scrutiny. As a threshold
matter, although all amateurism regulations constitute input market
restraints that are the product of an agreement among NCAA member
universities, their respective anticompetitive effects, if any, must be
identified. In other words, a particular NCAA amateurism rule
potentially violates the Sherman Act only if it reduces economic
competition among NCAA member schools for student-athletes’
services and harms consumer welfare. This may be a threshold that

demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports,’ and thus is best
categorized as an eligibility rule aimed at preserving the existence of amateurism and the
student-athlete.” (citations omitted)).
100 Mitten, Musselman & Burton, supra note 16, at 829–37.
101 No. C 09-1967 CW, 2013 WL 5778233, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2013).
102 Id. at *2.
103 Id. at *5 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
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immunizes regulations that do not serve the public interest in a
commercial/education model of intercollegiate athletics from antitrust
104
scrutiny.
O’Bannon illustrates both current problems as well as the
difficulties if antitrust law is used as the principal means of correcting
commercial exploitation of student-athletes who participate in bigtime sports. The initial litigation was brought by Ed O’Bannon, a
105
former UCLA basketball star.
O’Bannon challenged an alleged
agreement among NCAA schools that required student-athletes, as a
condition of participating in intercollegiate athletics, to permanently
waive any rights to publicity arising out of their intercollegiate
106
athletic participation. He specifically complained that his likeness
was being used by EA Sports in a video game, years after he had left
UCLA and, indeed, even after he had retired from a successful career
107
in professional basketball.
It is difficult to perceive a procompetitive economic justification
for this restraint, especially if the damages sought by O’Bannon’s
complaint were limited to royalties to be paid to former studentathletes on a pro rata basis after they had completed their eligibility.
Can anyone seriously claim that Pauley Pavilion (where UCLA plays
its basketball games) will face empty seats, or that the Pac-12
Network will face dwindling ratings, if fans know that the studentathletes representing UCLA will, years down the road, receive video
game royalties?
These issues get a bit more difficult if we consider whether the
clear line of demarcation between college and pro sports would be
crossed or blurred by providing a trust fund for royalties for current
players. To date, federal judges have not been willing to seriously
consider the boundaries of this clear line of demarcation, which has
been solely defined and established by the NCAA’s amateurism rules.

104 Thus, the court of appeals in Banks v. National Collegiate Athletics Association, 977
F.2d 1081, 1091–92 (7th Cir. 1992), found that the NCAA’s decision to operate sports on
an amateur basis meant there was no relevant economic market where member schools
competed against each other for the commercial athletic “services” of players. This
allowed the court to dismiss an antitrust complaint without any examination of whether the
regulations exploited student-athletes or genuinely served any noncommercial educational
goals. Id.
105 O’Bannon, at *1.
106 Id.
107 Id. at *2.
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Instead, most courts have characterized such rules as virtually per se
108
legal under antitrust law.
To the extent that the antitrust law theories raised in O’Bannon are
applied to limits on player compensation paid by NCAA universities
rather than third parties, such as EA Sports, the issues become even
more complex. First, courts are likely, even on serious
reconsideration, to reaffirm Justice Stevens’s observation in Board of
Regents that product differentiation requires that intercollegiate
109
athletes be full-time students.
This means that the cost of an
education is a condition of participation in big-time college sports.
Second, if it is lawful for the NCAA to require student-athletes to
be enrolled as full-time students at the colleges that they represent on
the field or court, the next question is whether antitrust laws would
allow the NCAA to regulate a university’s decision on what fees to
charge the student-athlete for the education it mandates. In a model of
competition that antitrust presumes, colleges will gladly pay for
education for the top stars, and will indeed likely pay far in excess of
the cost of education for the small handful of players whose skills are
so superior to the likely alternative player that they are worth
110
significant sums.
However, for many and probably most studentathletes, their “Value Over Replacement” (VORP) is not likely to be
111
very high, especially entering college from high school. Given the
existing legal barriers and other practical difficulties of unionizing

108

See supra notes 99–106 and accompanying text.
468 U.S. 85, 101–02 (1984).
110 For those unfamiliar with the world of sabermetrics, the concept is encapsulated in a
baseball metric called “Value Over Replacement Player” or “VORP.” Value over
Replacement Player–VORP, SPORTING CHARTS, http://www.sportingcharts.com
/dictionary/mlb/value-over-replacement-player-vorp.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2014).
111 In this regard, it is important to recognize that all major league professional athletes
in the United States earn hefty salaries regardless of their value to their respective clubs,
not because of the free market, but because the unions representing each league’s players
have collectively negotiated such a high minimum salary. The minimum salary for an
NHL player for the 2013–2014 season is $550,000. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT BETWEEN NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE AND NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE
PLAYERS’ ASS’N, art. 11.12 (2012). The minimum MLB salary for the 2014 season is
$500,000. 2012–2016 BASIC AGREEMENT, MLB & MLBPA, art. VI, § A (2012). In the
NBA, the minimum salary is dependent upon years of service, the lowest possible salary
during the 2013–14 season is $490,180 and can only be offered to a rookie. NBA
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, Exhibit C, C-1 (2011). For the 2014 season, the
minimum NFL salary for an active player is $420,000. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT, NFL & NFL PLAYERS’ ASS’N, art. 26, § 1(a) (2011).
109
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112

college athletes on a national basis,
the likely effect of a purely
antitrust remedy will be to correct the economic exploitation of a
handful of star players participating in big-time intercollegiate sports
at the expense of most other Division I football and men’s basketball
players, whose economic value would not justify a full athletic
113
scholarship.
Third, there is widespread support that society wants big-time
college football and men’s basketball programs to create surplus
funds that can be spent on socially worthy causes, such as broadbased intercollegiate athletic programs for students skilled in nonrevenue generating sports and university academic programs.
Antitrust law requires the NCAA to prove, as a matter of fact, that the
anticompetitive effects of its amateurism rules––which are the
product of an agreement among its collective member universities––
are justified as narrowly tailored to achieve procompetitive effects
that lower price, increase output, or render output more responsive to
114
consumer preferences.
Examples of procompetitive justifications
are preserving a different brand of athletic competition than
professional sports or maintaining a level of competitive balance
among its member institutions that fans prefer. Although NCAA
amateurism rules artificially reduce universities’ “labor” costs of
producing big-time football and men’s basketball programs by
prohibiting any price competition for players’ services and institutions
use these cost savings to fund socially desirable objectives, this is not

112

See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
Consider the antitrust litigation in professional football brought by members of a
development squad whose skills were not sufficient to make the major league roster. Prior
to the NFL owners’ adoption of a rule limiting salaries to $1000 per week, the plaintiffs
received compensation ranging from $2187 to $6250 per week. Brown v. Pro Football,
Inc., No. 90-1071, 1992 WL 88039, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 1992). Thus, many of the best
professional football players in the world, who were not on a professional team roster,
earned less than $35,000 in 1988 in a completely free market. By way of comparison, in
1989 Chicago Bears star linebacker Mike Singletary earned $750,000 and Hall of Fame
Quarterback Dan Marino earned just shy of $1.5 million. Rodney Fort, NFL Salaries 1989
(1989), available at https://umich.app.box.com/s/41707f0b2619c0107b8b/1/320026231
/2560907831/1. If a development squad player’s value in a free market is that low, we
believe it is highly probable that, even at a major program like Ohio State or Alabama, an
untested recruit will not be worth the full cost of education. Josephine R. Potuto, William
H. Lyons & Kevin N. Rask, What’s in a Name? The Collegiate Mark, the Collegiate
Model, and the Treatment of Student-Athletes, 92 OR. L. REV. 879, 918–33.
114 Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100–01 (1984).
113
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a procompetitive economic justification for anticompetitive
115
conduct.
Fourth, antitrust law is not the most effective means of ensuring
that revenues generated by these sports more effectively further a
university’s academic mission and student-athletes’ welfare or that
big-time collegiate sports programs do not exploit student-athletes
and consumers. Although the Sherman Act prohibits unreasonable
conduct, it does not require reasonable conduct. Nor is it “well-suited
to externally regulate NCAA internal governance of intercollegiate
athletics, particularly rules and agreements that define this unique
brand of athletic competition and the permissible scope of a
116
university’s relationship with its student-athletes.”
Finally, a piecemeal approach by way of antitrust litigation that
merely considers the legality of the particular challenged restraint will
not effectively solve systemic problems inherent in the production of
commercialized intercollegiate athletics by institutions of higher
education. These problems include an overemphasis on winning and
generating sports-related revenues, a misallocation of scarce
university resources to the athletic department, subordination of
higher education academic values to the forces of commercialization,
and student-athletes’ inability to realize the educational benefits of the
117
collegiate experience.
VI
EXTERNAL REGULATION BY AN INDEPENDENT COMMISSION IS THE
BETTER SOLUTION
The commercial/education model calls for the continued operation
of big-time commercial sports on college campuses. At least three
aspects of this model suggest that its continuation is in the public
interest. First, the affiliation with the collegiate tradition provides
entertainment value and public cohesion among alumni and the
community in ways that a purely professional minor sports
competition cannot provide. Second, the commitment to integrate
115 Cf. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692–93 (1978)
(holding that restricting bidding is illegal anticompetitive action); Law v. Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1021–24 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that making coaching
positions available to younger people and cost reduction are not valid procompetitive
justifications).
116 Mitten, Musselman & Burton, supra note 16, at 837.
117 Id. at 801–04.
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athletics with education that makes the model work provides
distinctive societal benefits by providing athletically gifted young
men and women with college education opportunities they might not
otherwise have. Third, if the NCAA’s constitutional goal of “prudent
investment” were taken seriously, it enables financially struggling
universities with the potential ability to support teaching and research
through subsidies from surplus funds generated by the school’s
intercollegiate athletics program.
This model inevitably results in economic cross-subsidies,
effective in furthering socially worthy objectives only if NCAA
member schools agree to fund academic support programs for
student-athletes, non-revenue sports, and university teaching and
research programs with surpluses. Surplus funds, in a completely
professionalized market, would be dissipated through competition by
paying top stars a sum equal to their short-run economic value to their
respective teams. As demonstrated above, any decision to engage in
anticompetitive behavior, in order to advance economic justifications
that do not promote competition, should not be entrusted entirely to a
private organization or its members. Nor can this model effectively
ensure that athletes and their fellow classmates benefit in a socially
desirable way from these surpluses if such a judgment is left to each
university. Thus, we propose a flexible regulatory regime that will
more reliably effectuate the public interest in intercollegiate sports
than the current system of NCAA monolithic control and domination
subject only to piecemeal and ineffectual antitrust review.
In perhaps the best antitrust decision in legal history, Judge
William Howard Taft (later President and United States Supreme
Court Chief Justice) forcefully condemned judicial decisions that
“have assumed the power to say, in respect to contracts which have
no other purpose and no other consideration on either side than the
mutual restraint of the parties, how much restraint of competition is in
118
the public interest, and how much is not.”
The jurisprudential
lesson is that this Solomon-like power, if not to be exercised by
unelected federal judges, should lie with our elected representatives in
Congress. They do have the power to exempt specific private
economic conduct from the federal antitrust laws and to protect public
welfare through an alternative regulatory scheme. To ensure that the
public and student-athletes who participate in big-time intercollegiate
118 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 283–84 (6th Cir. 1898),
aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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athletics realize the full benefits of the commercial/educational model
of intercollegiate athletics, we propose that Congress do so.
An independent commission overseeing big-time intercollegiate
athletics would serve a number of socially beneficial functions. It
would limit the ability of those wielding power within the NCAA to
adopt rules and make decisions that unduly exploit consumers,
student-athletes, and other stakeholders. It would also avoid the
problem of socially suboptimal internal rules and governance that
necessarily arise when participating members govern a sport in their
own parochial self-interest. By creating an independent regulatory
commission with rule-making authority to ensure that surplus
revenues generated by big-time intercollegiate sports are spent on
socially worthy causes, voluntary adoption of the commission’s rules
by the NCAA and its member universities would justify providing
their implementation with immunity from antitrust challenges.
We propose that federal intercollegiate athletics reform legislation
contain the following key features:
1. Creation of an independent commission and mandate
procedures assuring transparency and access to all
stakeholders, including a process akin to the notice-andcomment requirements of informal rulemaking under the
119
Administrative Procedure Act.
2. Inclusion of certain specific substantive provisions discussed
infra that would ensure that big-time intercollegiate athletics
are reformed in a socially beneficial way and that the
commercial/education model operates consistent with the
public interest.
3. Authorization for the Commission to promulgate non-binding
proposed rules to regulate intercollegiate athletics and direct
the Commission to consider and adopt, reject, or modify
specific proposals that do not warrant congressional mandate.
4. A grant of antitrust immunity to any university, athletic
conference, or the NCAA for conduct taken in compliance
119 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59 (2012). The notice requirement includes: a description of the
rule, the legal authority and the time and place that the public can comment; “interested
persons” must have the opportunity to submit “written data, views, or arguments with or
without opportunity for oral presentation”; and it must be published at least thirty days
before enactment with a statement considering the public submissions. Id. § 553; see also
JERRY L. MASHAW, RICHARD A. MERRILL & PETER M. SHANE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 508–12 (6th ed. 2009).
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with the Commission’s rules, provided that any stakeholder
allegedly harmed by these entities’ conduct in compliance with
the subject rule(s) may seek independent review to ensure that
the rules have a reasoned basis consistent with the public
interest.
A variety of professional sports organizations throughout the
world, as well as consumers, have benefited from regulation by an
entity independent of the participating competitors. One of us has
previously detailed the benefits to stock car racing of NASCAR’s
120
independent role as a competition organizer.
Key regulations
relating to integrity and other specific issues in North American major
professional sports leagues (e.g., MLB, NBA, NFL, NHL), whose
members are independently owned and operated clubs with divergent
economic interests, have been effectively governed by an independent
121
commissioner with broad best interests of the game authority.
In
Australia, the sport of rugby was recently reorganized with the
creation of an independent commission to achieve the potentially
conflicting goals of organizing a commercially successful major
league club competition, training and developing national teams in
international representative competitions, and supporting amateur and
122
grass-roots development of the sport. An independent commission
would likely yield similar benefits with regard to the conflict-laden
arena of rule-making in big-time college sports.
Adherence to mandatory procedures, including those equivalent to
informal rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act, would
significantly increase the transparency and inclusiveness of
commission rulemaking in contrast to the current structure of
economically self-serving rulemaking by NCAA member universities.
This process would particularly facilitate the opportunity for student120

ROSS & SZYMANSKI, supra note 76, at 70–107.
As detailed by the court in Milwaukee American Association v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298
(N.D. Ill. 1931), MLB owners responded to their own inability to respond effectively to
the “Black Sox” match-fixing scandal marring the 1919 World Series by appointing an
independent commissioner “with all the attributes of a benevolent but absolute despot.” Id.
at 299. However, today baseball’s commissioner does not have such unlimited powers.
Unless a matter “involves the integrity of, or public confidence in, the national game of
Baseball,” the Commissioner may not regulate with regard to a host of matters that the
MLB Constitution assigns to the clubs collectively or individually. MLB, MAJOR LEAGUE
CONSTITUTION, art. II, § 4 (2008); WEILER ET AL., supra note 89, at 27. Nor can the MLB
Commissioner be relied upon to protect various stakeholders from exploitation, given the
retained ability of MLB owners to fire the Commissioner.
122 See Australian Rugby League Commission, NRL.COM, http://www.nrl.com/About
/ARLCommission/tabid/10891/Default.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2014).
121
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123

athletes’ perspectives to be heard.
Moreover, a procedural
requirement that the commission provide a reasoned explanation for
its regulatory decisions (akin to that required for informal
rulemaking) would allow for greater transparency in how conflicting
objectives were accommodated and limit the ability of NCAA
universities and their representatives to lobby the commission for
rules that advance their own economic interests to the detriment of
others or to engage in unchallenged pretextual reasoning. Finally,
because the proposed legislation would confer antitrust immunity for
conduct that complies with commission regulations, this procedure
will require the commission to consider traditional competition policy
objections to proposed regulations. Furthermore, the commission
must explain why the public interest is served by what courts
applying antitrust law might find to be an anticompetitive practice
124
without an overriding procompetitive economic justification.
It is both sound policy and sound politics to expect that, for this
legislation to warrant Congress’s time and attention (and ultimately
its enactment), a core of three mandatory substantive requirements
need to be included therein to ensure that big-time intercollegiate
athletics are reformed in a socially beneficial manner.
First, schools should be required to guarantee at least a four-year
athletic scholarship, “which may be taken away only for failing to
meet minimum academic requirements, engaging in misconduct, or
125
voluntarily choosing not to continue playing a sport.” The practice
of running a player off a squad because the coach determines that a
more gifted athlete could better use the athletic scholarship is
inconsistent with the commercial/education model of intercollegiate
athletics and crosses the line of demarcation into professional sports.
Likewise, in sports in which partial scholarships are permitted, the
student-athlete should be protected from a scholarship reduction
except as a consequence of unsatisfactory academic performance or
misconduct. The public interest in wider educational access afforded
by intercollegiate athletics is frustrated if athletic considerations result
in a student’s loss of opportunity to obtain a degree.
123

Zimbalist, supra note 9, at 5, 22.
Congress could invite or mandate competition advocacy by the Department of
Justice’s Antitrust Division or the Federal Trade Commission to provide the commission
with expert analysis of the extent to which its regulations would immunize otherwise
illegal practices.
125 Mitten, Musselman & Burton, supra note 16, at 838.
124
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Second, schools should be required to provide free medical care or
health insurance for all sports-related injuries. Injured student-athletes
should also receive a scholarship extension for a period of time equal
to the time the athlete is medically unable to attend class due to
126
injury.
Third, the NCAA should be required to eliminate its requirement
that any university seeking to participate in a Division I sports
competition must operate at least fourteen sports at the Division I
127
level.
The legislation should authorize the commission to permit
the NCAA to condition a university’s receipt of NCAA championship
revenues in excess of expenses on the use of those funds for specified
purposes, including the operation of additional sports. However, our
view of the commercial/education model suggests that universities
should have the freedom to make their own independent judgment as
to whether funding a large number of non-revenue sports at the
Division I level is the best use of these revenues, or whether these
revenues should be devoted instead to academic endeavors such as
teaching and research.To provide an oversimplified illustration, if a
school were to determine that operating a Division I men’s basketball
program serves its educational mission, and complies with Title IX by
128
operating an equivalent women’s basketball program, for it to then
be required to spend funds it would prefer to spend on English
professors in order to fund Division I lacrosse and tennis programs is
both unsound social policy as well as inconsistent with the NCAA’s
own principles calling for athletic programs to be operated as an
129
integral part of the educational program.
To facilitate the success of our proposed federal legislation, we
believe that its mandatory substantive provisions should be limited.
However, in exercising its rule-making authority, we believe the
following ideas warrant the commission’s consideration:
 “Mandatory remedial assistance and tutoring for entering
student-athletes whose indexed academic credentials are below a

126

Id. at 840.
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 20.9.6.
128 More than forty years ago, Congress enacted Title IX of the Educational
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, evidencing its intention that providing equal
athletic participation opportunities to both men and women is a socially worthy public
policy objective, a judgment we do not seek to question. Moreover, we are not advocating
that Title IX be amended as part of our proposal for reform of big-time intercollegiate
athletics.
129 See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 1.3.1.
127
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certain percentile—twenty-fifth percentile, for example—for
130
their university’s freshman class.”
“The creation of a postgraduate scholarship program
administered by the NCAA and funded by a designated
percentage of the total net revenues generated by intercollegiate
football and men’s basketball, and perhaps other sports,
including the sales of merchandise incorporating aspects of
student-athletes’ persona, such as team jerseys with numbers
131
identifying individual players.”
Redefining a “full athletic scholarship” to provide additional
funds in a manner that would not compromise the “clear line of
demarcation” between college and professional sports; for
example, a “full” scholarship might include, in addition to
tuition, fees, books, supplies, and minimal room and board,
funds for additional housing, clothing, travel home, and modest
personal spending that would not exceed the amount that is
received from family sources by the top quartile of students at
the athlete’s university.
Permitting partial athletic scholarships in all sports with an
132
active program to supplement this aid with need-based aid.
Reducing the overall number of scholarships for big-time college
133
football.
Requiring university trustees to adopt procedures to explicitly
consider teaching and research alternatives to the investment in
intercollegiate athletic programs that are not financially self134
supporting.

Mitten, Musselman & Burton, supra note 16, at 840.
Id. at 841.
132 One of us has previously detailed why this proposal would facilitate a moreinformed choice of schools by athletic recruits and promote output-increasing competitive
balance. Ross, Radical Reform, supra note 19, at 952–58.
133 One of us has previously detailed why this proposal would facilitate outputincreasing competitive balance while affording the university cost savings to be used on
other socially worthy causes. Id.
134 ASS’N OF GOVERNING BDS. OF UNIVS. & COLLS, supra note 23, at 3
(recommending that university’s board of trustees “should act decisively to uphold the
integrity of the athletics program and its alignment with the academic mission of the
institution”); see also RAWLINGS PANEL, supra note 25, at 9 (“We believe that Boards of
Trustees, presidents, commissioners, athletics directors, and the public more generally,
should focus on the objective of bringing greater alignment between athletic and academic
expenditures at the institutional level as a way of preserving the virtues and benefits of
intercollegiate athletics and teaching and research on each of our campuses.”).
131
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 Requiring schools to offer additional scholarship aid to studentathletes who leave school in good academic standing and later
seek to complete their college education.
 Requiring schools to offer financial or other incentives, such as a
graduation bonus, to student-athletes, or at the very least to atrisk student-athletes to increase graduation rates for Division I
football and men’s basketball.
 Requiring each Division I university’s intercollegiate athletics
department to be financially self-sufficient (i.e., its revenues
exceed its expenses over a designated period, such as three to
five years). This would give each university the flexibility to
determine which mix of sports to offer and invest in to achieve
its individualized academic and intercollegiate athletics mission
135
consistent with Title IX.
 Requiring the NCAA to distribute a significant percentage of
pooled football and men’s basketball revenues to reward
individual universities for achieving objectives consistent with
values of intercollegiate athletics (e.g., high graduation rates)
and to determine whether additional redistribution of pooled
funds to facilitate competitive balance in big-time football and
men’s basketball would maximize overall fan appeal or serve
136
other distinctive interests.
We do not advocate that the commission’s regulations have the
direct force of law. Rather, we recommend that the legislation provide
that the NCAA, along with the individual institutions and athletic
conferences that voluntarily opt to adhere to the entirety of
commission regulations, receive a statutory immunity for conduct
135

Cf. Ross, Radical Reform, supra note 19, at 949.
See Zimbalist, supra note 9, at 21–22 (“[E]qualizing the distribution of revenue may
address both the goal of promoting greater competitive balance and the goal of containing
costs. Serendipitously, it may also rebalance the scales in favor of educational attainment
and educational growth. . . . Importantly, revenue redistribution can accomplish the
important goal of changing the incentives facing intercollegiate athletics by lowering the
distribution tied to commercial success and raising the distribution tied to educational
success. . . . [I]n 2011-12 the NCAA distributed $467 million [to Division I universities].
. . .[But] none of the $467 million is allocated according to the academic success of
student-athletes or other measures of school educational success. Restructuring these
NCAA distributions, then, would not only be desirable from the perspective of financial
solvency and blunting the incentives toward commercialism, but also from the perspective
of incentivizing schools’ focus on educational outcomes.”). At the same time, we note that
the empirical evidence from professional sports does not clearly demonstrate that, from a
commercial or consumer-welfare perspective, increased competitive balance is necessarily
desirable for big-time sports. See, e.g., Stefan Szymanksi, The Economic Design of
Sporting Contests, 41 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1137, 1153–55 (2003).
136
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taken in compliance with the regulations. This will exempt them from
liability under federal antitrust statutes and state laws that might
outlaw practices implemented pursuant to these rules as contrary to
state antitrust law, common law, or public policy.
In order to ensure that the public interest is truly served by such an
exemption, it is essential that there be external legal review of the
commission’s regulations. Judicial review of commission decisions
under the Administrative Procedure Act is one means to provide
oversight. However, court dockets are crowded, and federal judges
often lack expertise in this area. For this reason, we advocate
conditioning antitrust immunity on the willingness of the NCAA,
athletic conferences, and individual schools to submit disputes over
whether a commission regulation is the product of open and
transparent procedures and reasoned decision-making to private
arbitration. We suggest that Congress borrow from the Ted Stevens
137
Olympic and Amateur Sports Act,
which requires that disputes
between Olympic sport athletes and national governing bodies for
these sports be resolved by final and binding arbitration pursuant to
the American Arbitration Association’s commercial arbitration
138
procedures.

137

36 U.S.C. §§ 220501–220529 (2012).
Id. § 220509. The legislation would therefore clearly protect the NCAA and its
member institutions against antitrust litigation for adhering to rules adopted by the
commission that meet procedural standards. Different considerations arise considering
litigation accusing the NCAA or a university of improperly failing to follow commission
regulations with regard to specific conduct (for example, an eligibility determination for a
student-athlete). In this instance, we believe that de novo arbitration, again akin to that
provided for in the Stevens Act for specific competition-related determinations made by
national governing boards, is the best model. To illustrate, suppose that the commission
enacted regulations barring intercollegiate athletics participation for student-athletes who
knowingly received payment for athletics participation from a professional sports club,
and that this regulation was either upheld under administrative review or not challenged in
a timely manner. This would bar a student-athlete ruled ineligible by the NCAA from
challenging the action on the grounds that the rule itself was unlawful. But suppose the
plaintiff sued on the grounds that the NCAA had incorrectly determined that he had
violated the rule. We propose that the commission adopt a separate regulation that studentathletes can be required, as a condition of intercollegiate athletics participation, to submit
all disputes to binding arbitration. This would mean that the eligibility question would be
reviewed quickly and finally by an independent arbitrator. (Alternatively, the NCAA
would have the option of preserving its own prerogative to determine eligibility
unconstrained by outside arbitration, but then risk antitrust exposure in the event that a
plaintiff could demonstrate that their ruling was not in compliance with the commission’s
rules as well as otherwise stated in an antitrust claim.).
138
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Mandating binding arbitration for disputes otherwise immune from
federal or state antitrust challenges serves several purposes. It ensures
that the regulatory commission policies are truly based on reasoned
decisions. Where public policies—including those inconsistent with
free competition—are preferred, review similar to that used by courts
to review decisions of administrative agencies assures that the
commissioners articulate justifications. The legislation should provide
that arbitral review of the commission’s immunity-conferring
regulations be akin to rational basis judicial review of informal rule
139
making
(not de novo review), ensure that stakeholders were
afforded the ability to comment on the proposed rule, and that the
commission explained its rationale for making its rule and for
rejecting alternatives.
At the same time, one of the primary reasons for using arbitration
to resolve sports-related disputes is the need for, and the ability of
private arbitration to provide, a speedy resolution of time-sensitive
issues. Legislation could provide a short window of perhaps fifteen to
thirty days for those adversely affected by a commission regulation to
demand arbitration and mandate that an arbitral panel render its
decision within forty-five to sixty days of a hearing.
CONCLUSION
A commercial/education model for intercollegiate athletics posits
that major colleges and universities will offer popular and
commercially lucrative sporting entertainment as part of an integrated
scheme that provides athletically-gifted students with increased
educational opportunities and uses surplus funds generated by bigtime football and men’s basketball for socially worthy causes. The
current structure of self-interested internal governance by the
NCAA’s member universities, combined with external microregulation by means of antitrust and contract law litigation on a caseby-case basis, is not the most effective means to achieve this
objective. The existing internal rulemaking process used by the
NCAA and its member schools has not adequately achieved the
NCAA’s own objectives of protecting student-athletes from
commercial exploitation, ensured that all student-athletes receive the
educational opportunities inherent in making intercollegiate athletics
an integral part of a university’s educational mission, established rules
essential to clearly demarcate college and professional sports,
139

See MASHAW, MERRILL & SHANE, supra note 119, at 514–18.
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prevented the adoption of rules with the primary purpose or effect of
promoting self-interested university interests under the rubric of
competitive equity, and ensured that intercollegiate athletic
departments are operated by individual schools in a fiscally prudent
manner.
A federal regulatory commission would have the necessary
authority to establish rules that effectively prevent intercollegiate
athletics from crossing the line between a commercial/education
model and a commercial/professional model for intercollegiate sports,
enhance the academic integrity of intercollegiate athletics, promote
more competitive balance in intercollegiate sports competition, and
require university athletic departments to operate with fiscal
responsibility. The “carrot” of antitrust immunity would provide the
NCAA, athletic conferences, and their member institutions with a
significant incentive to adopt and comply with its rules to achieve
these objectives, which would be the product of a transparent process
in which all stakeholders (including student-athletes) and members of
the public would have a full opportunity to be heard by the
independent commission.

MITTEN (DO NOT DELETE)

878

6/12/2014 12:17 PM

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92, 837

